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The Soft Power of Anglia: British Cold War Cultural Diplomacy in the USSR 
 
The article contributes to the growing literature on the cultural Cold War through an 
exploration of the British national projection magazine Anglia, produced by the Foreign 
Office for distribution in the USSR from 1962 to 1992. As well as drawing attention to the 
significance of national magazines in general, the article sheds light on Britain’s distinctive 
approach to propaganda and cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. It considers why the 
magazine was set up and endured for so long, despite considerable reservations about its 
value. It examines how Britain was projected in a manner that accorded with British 
understandings about the need for ‘subtle’ propaganda. Finally, it addresses the question of 
the magazine’s impact in the USSR.  
 
Key words: Britain, Soviet Union, Cold War, Propaganda, Cultural Diplomacy, Soft 
Power 
 
In the ‘struggle for men’s minds’ that was the Cold War, the deployment of soft power – the 
power of a state to attract and persuade through its values, culture, way of life – assumed 
unprecedented importance.
1
 Both East and West relied on various forms of propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy in their efforts to communicate the merits of their respective systems to 
foreign publics.
2
  One vital tool for both camps was print, and the role of books and 
                                                          
1
 ‘Soft power’ is the helpful, if somewhat over-used term, coined by Joseph Nye. See his Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics (New York: World Affairs, 2004). The cliche ‘the struggle for men’s minds’ 
paraphrases Truman’s 1950 declaration to that effect: Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, 
Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 14. 
2
 ‘Propaganda’ is understood here as ‘the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the 
transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interests of the 
propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.’ Nicholas Cull, David Culbert and David 
Welch (eds.), Propaganda and Mass Persuasion (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 322. ‘Cultural 
diplomacy’ refers to the practice whereby a government harnesses its culture (in the widest sense) to support its 
foreign policy objectives. In involves the projection of a nation’s image or ‘brand’ abroad. Cultural diplomacy is 
frequently regarded as part of, or closely associated with, ‘public diplomacy’, the more general process of 
government-subsidised book programs in the cultural Cold War has deservedly attracted 
much scrutiny.
3
  Magazines were no less important, however. Boosted by a communications 
revolution originating in the late nineteenth century, mass circulation periodicals were 
enormously popular by the middle decades of the twentieth, with illustrated magazines such 
as Life, Reader’s Digest, and Paris-Match enjoying a particular boom.4 Increasingly viewed 
as a means of exerting global political influence, magazines of various types were part of the 
arsenal of all the major powers during the Cold War. They included not only periodicals of 
the covertly-funded Encounter and Der Monat variety,
 5
 but also national projection 
magazines produced by governments as an explicit means of promoting their country’s image 
or ‘brand’. Considerable sums were spent on this form of national self-advertisement by the 
US, the USSR, and Britain, among others. However, apart from a few discussions of Amerika 
- the US periodical aimed at the Soviet Union - there has not been any sustained analysis of 
this important Cold War phenomenon.
 6  
 
We examine the question of national projection magazines through the lens of the British 
publication, Anglia, produced with significant input from the Foreign Office’s clandestine 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
government engagement with foreign publics as a means of advancing national interests. As Cull observes, the 
term ‘public diplomacy’ originated in the US in 1965 as a more palatable alternative to ‘propaganda’. In 
practice, the distinctions between ‘propaganda’, ‘cultural diplomacy’ and ‘public diplomacy’ are often blurred. 
Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried (eds.), Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (Oxford: Berghahn, 
2010), pp. 13-14; Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 259-60.  
3
 Greg Barnhisel and Catherine Turner (eds.), Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda, and the Cold War 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret 
Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), pp. 294-304; Frances 
Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta Books, 1999); 
Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003); 
Louise Robbins, ‘Publishing American Values: The Franklin Book Programs as Cold War Cultural Diplomacy’, 
Library Trends, 55/3, 2007; John P. Matthews, ‘The West’s Secret Marshall Plan for the Mind’, Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 16/3, 2003; Mary Niles Maack, ‘Books and Libraries as Instruments of 
Cultural Diplomacy in Francophone Africa during the Cold War’, Libraries and Culture, 36/1, 2001 
4
 Osgood, Total Cold War, p. 15; Barnhisel and Turner, Pressing the Fight, p. 12. 
5
 Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? 
6
 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, pp. 118-9; Richmond Cultural Exchange, pp. 148-51; Andrew Yarrow, ‘Selling a 
New Vision of America to the World: Changing Messages in Early U.S. Cold War Print Propaganda’, Journal 
of Cold War Studies, 11/4, 2009. 
Information Research Department (IRD), and distributed in the USSR from1962 to 1992. As 
well as drawing attention to the significance of national projection magazines in general, by 
focusing closely on the case of Anglia, we aim to shed light on Britain’s distinctive approach 
to propaganda and cultural diplomacy behind the Iron Curtain. While American efforts to 
influence Eastern bloc opinion have been the object of detailed investigation,
 7
 only recently 
has attention turned to parallel initiatives undertaken by Western European states, including 
those of Britain.
8
 Notwithstanding ambiguous feelings in Britain about the whole concept of 
‘overseas propaganda’, with its connotations of totalitarian media manipulation, the British 
government, in contrast to that of the US, had the advantage of extensive and diverse 
experience in the business of national projection which it was in a strong position to build 
upon. Despite, or perhaps because of, its waning global power, Britain was determined to 
offer an alternative, British contribution to a sphere which would otherwise have been 
dominated by the US. This contribution was presented as complementing, rather than 
undermining, the activities of Britain’s closest partner in the ‘information’ field.9 
                                                          
7
 See, for  example, Osgood, Total Cold War;  Hixson, Parting the Curtain; Cull, The Cold War and the United 
States Information Agency; Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union 
(New York: New York University Press,1999); Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 
Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US Propaganda 
and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).  
8
 On some Western European initiatives, see Giles Scott-Smith ‘Interdoc and Western European Psychological 
Warfare: The American Connection’1958’ Intelligence and National Security 26/2-3, 2011; Giles Scott-Smith 
Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012); 
Aniko Macher ‘Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1957-1963: Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a 
Communist Country’ in Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy. There is a growing 
body of literature on British activities: Gary Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and Voice 
of America in International Politics, 1956-1964 (Basingstoke: Macmillan,1996);  Michael Nelson, War of the 
Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (London: Brasseys, 1997); FCO 
Historians, IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department 1946-48 
(London: FCO/LRD, 1995); Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (Stroud: Sutton, 
1998); Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John 
Murray, 2001); Andrew Defty, Britain, America, and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953: The Information 
Research Department (London: Routledge, 2004); Lowell Schwartz, Political Warfare Against the Kremlin: US 
and British Propaganda Policy at the Beginning of the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Mark B. Smith 
‘Peaceful coexistence at all costs:  Cold War exchanges between Britain and the Soviet Union in 1956’ Cold 
War History 12/3, 2012.  
9
 Philip Taylor, The Projection of Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Philip Taylor, 
British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), especially pp. 
227-29; Defty, Britain; Schwartz, Political Warfare, p. 3; Linda Risso ‘A Difficult Compromise: British and 
 Whereas studies of the cultural Cold War tend to concentrate on the early stages of the 
conflict, our account begins at the point where many conclude: in the late 1950s. It starts by 
considering how and why the British project to create a Russian magazine finally took off, 
despite facing some formidable obstacles along the way. It then addresses the crucial question 
of the magazine’s contents: what kind of story did Anglia tell about Britain in the 1960s, the 
formative years of the publication? Various strategies were adopted to ensure the projection 
of an attractive yet credible image of a modern, progressive Britain and minimise charges that 
the magazine was simply a vehicle for crude propaganda. It is worth noting that the process 
of explaining British identity to a Soviet audience often required that those involved first 
explain this identity to themselves.  The article concludes with a discussion of the elusive 
subject of Anglia’s reception in the USSR. Although ascertaining the nature and extent of its 
influence was always going to be problematic, the perception that the magazine was having a 
positive effect was one of the reasons it endured for so long despite constant questioning of 
the benefits of such intangible forms of soft power. 
 
The origins of Anglia 
Following the post-war deepfreeze, the thaw in Soviet relations with the West which occurred 
after Stalin’s death opened up new opportunities for various forms of cultural diplomacy and 
exchange. Assuming that exposure to Western values and ways of life would, in the long run, 
contribute to a process of evolutionary change within the Soviet bloc, governments in the 
‘free world’ began to take East-West cultural relations seriously.10 It was in this context that 
Britain’s initial proposals for a ‘Russian Magazine’ emerged. The Soviet authorities had 
always gone to great lengths to obstruct the circulation of what it considered to be ‘capitalist 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
American Plans for a Common  Anti-Communist Propaganda Response in Western Europe, 1948-1958’ 
Intelligence and National Security 26/2-3, 2011. 
10
 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, p. 101; Defty, Britain, pp. 239-41; Schwartz, Political Warfare, p. 181. 
propaganda’ - in the 1950s, for example, the only British newspaper in general circulation in 
the Soviet Union was the communist Daily Worker, while the BBC’s Russian Service was 
routinely, if ineffectively, jammed. Gradually, small and not entirely symbolic steps were 
undertaken to ease the barriers to communication. The meeting between Bulganin, 
Khrushchev and Eden in Britain in April 1956 represented something of a breakthrough, with 
the two sides issuing a joint declaration on the desirability of furthering cultural exchange and 
taking ‘practical steps directed towards ensuring a freer exchange of information by the 
spoken and the written word.’11  
 
A magazine seemed an obvious medium through which Britain could disseminate 
information by the written word. FO-sponsored ‘general projection’ magazines such as 
Commonwealth Today and the Arabic-language Al Aalam played a prominent role in British 
cultural diplomacy from the early 1950s, and were endorsed by the Drogheda committee’s 
review of the Overseas Information Services (1952-53) which made a strong case for what it 
called British ‘overseas propaganda’ in the Cold War ‘struggle for men’s minds’. The 
committee observed that although normally existing organs of the press should be used for 
the purposes of such propaganda, there were special circumstances which warranted the 
creation of Government-produced illustrated magazines.
12
 The 1957 review of the Overseas 
Information Services conducted by Dr Charles Hill in the wake of the Suez crisis went even 
further. As part of a general call for greater investment in information work, it recommended 
improvements to the existing periodicals targeted at the Commonwealth and Middle East, as 
well as the introduction of new magazines - a proposal clearly designed with the Soviet bloc 
in mind.
13
 
                                                          
11
 Cmd. 9753, appendix; Smith, ‘Peaceful coexistence at all costs’. 
12
 Cmd. 9138, pp. 8, 19-20; on Al Aalam, see James Vaughan ‘”A Certain Idea of Britain”: British Cultural 
Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1945-57’ Contemporary British History, 19/2, 2005. 
13
 Cmnd. 225, p. 4; TNA FO 953/1833 Hill to Harvey, 28 February 1957. 
 The magazine format was deemed eminently suitable for the USSR with its highly-developed 
culture of reading.
14
 Periodicals were particularly popular with Soviet readers, and their 
circulation increased hugely in this period, reaching 2.6 billion by 1970, 14 times the 1950 
level.
15
 The serious ‘thick journal’, such as Novyi mir - a blend of literature and broader 
socio-political articles – enjoyed phenomenal success amongst the burgeoning intelligentsia, 
particularly during the Khrushchev-era ‘Thaw’.16  The Foreign Office was evidently well-
aware of this tendency, with one official commenting that ‘the Russians wanted a good 
read.’17  
 
A previous British government periodical, the weekly illustrated newspaper British Ally 
(Britanskii soiuznik), set up during the period of Anglo-Soviet wartime cooperation, had been 
well received in the USSR, although it suffered when relations soured in the late 1940s, and 
was terminated in 1950.
18
 As early as 1954, there were suggestions that it be revived in a new 
form. At this stage, the proposals never got off the ground because of continuing scepticism 
about Soviet government attitudes. However support for such a publication gathered 
momentum from 1955, particularly after the re-launch of the US illustrated magazine 
Amerika.
19
 Amerika, published from 1945 until 1952, was resurrected in 1956 following a 
US-Soviet agreement concerning the reciprocal distribution of national projection magazines; 
its Soviet counterpart in the US was USSR, later renamed Soviet Life. The USSR distributed a 
similar periodical in Britain, Soviet Weekly (available in ‘every common room in the country’ 
                                                          
14
 Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
15
 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural 
Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 12. 
16
 Edith Frankel, Novy Mir: A Case Study in the Politics of Literature, 1952-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
17
 TNA INF 12/1094 minutes, 27 January 1965. 
18
 Vladimir Pechatnov, ‘The Rise and Fall of Britansky Soyuznik: A Case Study in Soviet Response to British 
Propaganda of the Mid-1940s’, The Historical Journal, 41/1, 1998. 
19
 TNA FO 371/111774. 
according to the IRD’s Hugh Lunghi) .20 Although the British were evidently concerned not 
to be left out of this accelerating periodical diplomacy, the FO remained unconvinced of 
Soviet willingness to tolerate Western magazines, particularly when it transpired that the 
authorities were doing their best to control and limit the circulation of Amerika by restricting 
sales at ‘open’ kiosks and returning large numbers of allegedly ‘unsold’ copies to the 
Embassy.
21
  
 
The Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 created additional dilemmas. On the one 
hand, it caused temporary setbacks in cultural relations, as public revulsion created 
considerable pressure to ostracise the USSR, while on the other, it persuaded some of the 
urgency of extending cultural contacts in the interests of fomenting change, particularly 
amongst the Soviet intelligentsia and youth, who were perceived to be potentially rebellious 
and receptive to Western values. Cecil Parrott, formerly of the IRD and now Minister at the 
British Embassy in Moscow, pressed for a policy of what he called ‘injecting…western ideas’ 
to encourage these groups.
22
 Another Embassy official, R. D. C. McAlpine, was convinced 
that a British magazine would be particularly useful, however limited its circulation, arguing 
that ‘In view of the present thirst for Western ideas among certain sections of the Soviet 
public, we consider that if only about 4,000 copies of our magazine were sold, their effect 
would justify the expenditure involved in producing several times as many copies.’ He was of 
the view that the post-Hungary deterioration in East-West relations was not a reason for 
abandoning the project; rather it was a reason to step up efforts to transmit Western ideas.
23
  
 
                                                          
20
 Lashmar and Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, p. 50. 
21
 TNA BW 2/532 Hayter to Gallagher, 29 November 1956; Richmond, Cultural Exchange, p. 150. 
22
 TNA FO 371/129124 Parrott to Brimelow, 11 January 1957.  
23
 TNA FO 953/1833 McAlpine to Simpson, 25 February 1957. 
While the British government had accepted the case for a magazine by the end of 1957, 
because of the vicissitudes of East-West relations and the intractable nature of British-Soviet 
negotiations, as well as financial considerations, it would be over four years before the 
publication of the first issue. A secret preliminary agreement at the Anglo-Soviet cultural 
talks in November 1959 was followed by a series of negotiations during 1960; these 
advanced slowly and erratically, despite the efforts of a facilitator in the form of Wright 
Miller, a former editor of British Ally with long-standing interest in the USSR and sympathy 
for the ‘Russians as People’ (the title of his well-known book of 1961.)24 At one stage, the 
whole project was nearly torpedoed by Ralph Murray, the IRD’s first head and at that point 
Assistant Under-Secretary responsible for Information, who started to express doubts about a 
venture projected to cost in the region of £25,000 net p.a. (the price was to be heavily 
subsidised to make it affordable to Soviet readers).  In the autumn of 1960, Murray argued 
that in the light of budgetary pressures on information work, this money might be better spent 
on urgent initiatives in the newly independent states of Africa. In comparison with these 
pressing needs, as well as the expanding programme of cultural exchanges with the Soviet 
Union, the magazine only possessed what he claimed was ‘rather doubtful and very long-term 
value.’25  
 
In response, officials attached to the Northern Department, the Embassy, the Cultural 
Exchange Department and the IRD all mounted a strong defence of the project. The IRD’s 
current head, Donald Hopson, cited the conclusions of the recent Ten-Year Planning study 
that ‘The best, perhaps the only, hope for a peaceful end to the East-West conflict is that the 
East should mellow into a bourgeois prosperity where it will lose its urge to win the world for 
communism’, a process which Britain could assist by developing its links with the USSR. On 
                                                          
24
 TNA INF 12/1095 ‘Notes on the Agreement Concerning an English Magazine’, 27 February 1960; Wright 
Miller, Russians as People (New York: Dutton, 1961). 
25
 TNA FO 953/1991 Murray minute, 23 September 1960. 
the question of the magazine, he argued that it would be a mistake to leave this to Americans 
‘when we have an important contribution to make’, concluding that ‘The policy objective 
itself is surely so important that we should not waste any drops of water which could help in 
the process of erosion.’ Sir Frank Roberts, a veteran observer of Soviet affairs who had 
recently taken up the post of Ambassador to Moscow, also favoured spending relatively small 
sums of money ‘on long-term bread-and-butter projects such as magazines and (in other 
countries) the teaching of English, rather than on prestige cake, such as theatres and ballets.’ 
He believed that Amerika was effective - ‘It is the only drop in a very large ocean but at the 
present time there is no other’ - and that a British magazine would complement the American 
effort.
26
 
 
These arguments prevailed, and the magazine was formally established by an Exchange of 
Notes of 12 January 1961. The wording of the agreement largely followed the model of the 
1955 US-Soviet agreement on Amerika. An important, and later contentious, clause specified 
that the magazine should be ‘non-political in character’ and ‘devoted to an objective 
presentation of various aspects of British life, particularly in the sphere of culture, science 
and technology.’ This was the price to be paid for a further clause maintaining that it would 
not be subject to censorship by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet agency, Soiuzpechat’, was 
to distribute 50,000 copies of the quarterly magazine, with 10% of these on subscription, 
while a further 2000 complimentary copies were to be distributed by the British Embassy to 
Soviet institutions and individuals. If any copies remained unsold for three months, 
Soiuzpechat’ had the right to return them to the Embassy for a refund – an opportunity for the 
authorities to restrict the distribution of ideologically suspect editions. In return for all this, 
                                                          
26
 TNA FO 953/1991, Hopson minute, 25 November 1960; FO 953/1991 Roberts to Murray, 1 November 1960. 
the British government agreed to facilitate the distribution of Soviet Weekly in the event of 
any difficulties.
27
   
 
Following this hard-won agreement, various practical arrangements were put in place. 
Responsibility for the production of the magazine was assigned to the Central Office of 
Information, a service department established in 1946 to produce publicity material for 
government departments.
 28
 The magazine’s editor - initially Wright Miller himself - was 
officially attached to the COI. Ralph Murray decided that the IRD should take charge of the 
magazine’s editorial policy because of its expertise in the Soviet Union and understanding of 
‘Russian sensibilities, pretensions etc.’ Formed in 1948 with the explicit remit of countering 
communist propaganda, this clandestine FO department had originally concentrated on anti-
communist propaganda in Britain and areas of British influence, but from the mid-1950s it 
turned its attention to the Soviet bloc. The IRD was expected to consult the FO’s Northern 
Department and the British Embassy in Moscow on policy-related matters, while the 
Information Executive Department was given responsibility for the technical aspects of the 
magazine’s production. The IRD official placed in charge of the magazine was Mavis King 
of the department’s Soviet Desk. Since King had worked with Miller on British Ally, it was 
felt that the two would cooperate well.
29
 As would later become clear, a good working 
relationship between the COI’s editor and the IRD official handling the magazine was crucial 
as there was always the potential for tension to develop between them.  
 
The title of the magazine was the subject of some discussion. Since Britain was (and is) 
generally known as Англия  (Anglia - England) in Russia and the Soviet Union, Anglia 
                                                          
27
 Cmnd. 1287. 
28
 M. Grant, ‘Towards a Central Office of Information: Continuity and Change in British Government 
Information Policy 1939-51’ Journal of Contemporary History, 34/1, 1999. 
29
 Defty, Britain, p. 239; TNA FCO 95/1232 Murray to Hopson, 8 February 1961; Hopson to Murray, 10 
February 1961. 
seemed a natural choice by analogy with the two other national projection magazines then 
circulating in the USSR, Amerika and Jugoslaviia.
 30
  However, it was acknowledged that this 
might provoke a vociferous reaction from the ‘Scottish lobby’ in particular: the latter had 
already had cause to take offence in 1957 when it was proposed to Parliament that the USSR 
should have a magazine like Amerika to show the ‘English way of life’, provoking some MPs 
to ask ‘what about the Scots and Welsh?’ and to request that a ‘little Celtic flavour’ be added 
to the publication.
31
 Yet it proved difficult to find a suitably inclusive alternative, with one 
suggestion, British Life, vetoed in the USSR on the grounds that the word ‘life’ had acquired 
a hint of ‘foreign propaganda penetration’: ‘It begins to smell in fact, though not so badly as 
“peace” and “democracy” do to us when Communists use them’, wrote Miller. 
Velikobritaniia (Great Britain) was also rejected by FO officials who argued that it sounded 
too pompous and carried colonialist overtones in the USSR. A compromise suggestion, 
Britannia, was deemed to be poor Russian. Finally, it was agreed that the title Anglia should 
be accompanied by a sub-title: ‘a magazine about life in Great Britain today’.32  
 
Subtle propaganda: The projection of Britain in Anglia 
This protracted discussion about the name of the magazine exemplifies the problems inherent 
in any attempt to establish a suitable narrative about contemporary Britain - it was one thing 
to propose a magazine about Britain, but quite another to agree on precisely how to project 
the amorphous and contested subject of ‘life in Great Britain today’. The approach of the 
IRD, which bore ultimate responsibility for the magazine’s editorial line, was informed by 
the department’s interpretation of Anglia’s objectives:  
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 I transliterate Англия as ‘Anglia’ throughout this article, as this was the form used by the FO.  
31
 TNA INF 12/1095 Draft FO Brief, August 1958; FO 953/1990 FO to Moscow, 25 January 1960; Hansard HC 
Debates, 10 April 1957, Series 5, vol. 568, cc. 1133-34. 
32
 TNA FO 953/1990 Mason minute, 22 March 1960, Morgan minute, 23 March 1960; FO 953/1991 Moscow to 
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The magazine aims at presenting an attractive, truthful and convincing picture of all 
aspects of Britain to serious Soviet readers. Although “Anglia” cannot deal directly 
with political subjects, this presentation of an honest and accurate picture of Britain 
can both counteract the misleading account given in the Soviet press, and reveal how 
unfavourably many aspects of life in the Soviet Union compare with Britain.  
 
In the understanding of the IRD, therefore, the magazine was first and foremost a propaganda 
weapon designed to ‘achieve the maximum educative effect’ by projecting Britain in a way 
that would serve national interests and further the cause of anti-communism.
 33
  Anglia’s 
propaganda mission was required to be discreet, however, not only to minimise the risk of 
offending the Soviet authorities and alienating readers, but also because of the traditional 
British distaste for the blatant manipulation and distortion associated with ‘totalitarian’ 
propaganda. The more subtle British approach was supposed to be based on the dissemination 
of truthful information to a rational, educated public. Although Anglia was expected to 
project a predominantly favourable image of Britain, this image had to be founded on 
accurate facts and targeted at ‘serious’ readers capable of drawing their own conclusions 
when presented with these facts.
 34
  
 
A concern that Anglia’s propaganda mission should remain as unobtrusive as possible was 
evident from the outset. As early as 1956, Britain’s ambassador in Moscow, Sir William 
Hayter, argued that the putative magazine ‘would not be in any way a medium of straight 
propaganda but rather more designed to let in a breath of fresh air where it might be 
effective’, while in 1957 the Embassy stressed that they would have to be ‘careful not to risk 
                                                          
33
  TNA FCO 95/348 Bayne to Clive, 9 April 1968, memorandum on Anglia. 
34
 Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 80 
accusations of propaganda (and to avoid this we shall have to be very subtle indeed!)’35  The 
British approach was distinguished from that of the US in this respect, with the COI’s 
Director of Publications, J. H. McMillan, proposing a ‘rather subtler approach’ than the 
‘blatantly lavish efforts of the Americans.’ It was always envisaged that Britain’s magazine 
would be more modest than Amerika, partly for financial reasons and so as not to duplicate 
American efforts, but also because of differing ideas about the whole matter of ‘publicity’.  
While Britain and the US cooperated closely in this field, there was a prevailing assumption 
in the Foreign Office that American practices were inferior; for example one FO official 
observed very little difference between British and American policies towards Eastern 
Europe, apart from in the area of ‘publicity’ where ‘the Americans are more adventurous than 
we are.’ This strategy had ‘not always proven more effective than our quieter methods.’36  
 
‘Quiet’ Amerika certainly was not. A large-format, sixty-page monthly magazine with a print- 
run of 50,000 copies, it was full of glossy colour photographs and designed for a mass 
readership. It promoted the American way of life in a quite unashamed fashion: the first issue 
included a five-page spread on American cars, accompanied by a glaringly obvious price 
chart.
37
 By contrast, it was proposed in 1957 that Britain’s magazine should appear quarterly, 
initially in a run of about 10,000 copies, and that it would have an unusual pocket-sized 
format (similar to that of the Readers’ Digest), which was considered to be more subtle than 
that of Amerika. The small size would allow the reader to hide it in their pocket, and mean 
that it was likely to be longer-lasting, passed around and kept on bookshelves. While it was 
intended that the magazine should be illustrated, the main emphasis was to be upon text 
oriented towards a particular readership ‘the intelligent, non-technical, layman, particularly of 
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 Schwartz, Political Warfare, pp. 150, 169. For another example, see Defty, Britain, p. 104. 
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 Richmond, Cultural Exchange, p. 149; Schwartz, Political Warfare, p. 198. 
the emergent middle class and the administrative class.’ 38 This was in line with the elite-
oriented tradition of British overseas propaganda, which was reinforced by the Drogheda 
report recommendations that the Information Services should target the ‘influential few and 
through them at the many.’39  
 
All these proposals were ultimately adopted, thereby ensuring that Anglia’s identity remained 
quite distinct from that Amerika.
40
 Once the magazine was up and running, a variety of 
strategies were employed to render its propaganda content, in the words of the Assistant 
Under-Secretary responsible for Information, John Peck, ‘minimal and virtually 
undetectable’. For example, as Peck explained, if the Soviet press included a discussion about 
an unsatisfactory aspect of Soviet life, such as housing conditions, Anglia might then respond 
with an article on housing developments in Britain.
41
 As this suggests, Anglia avoided any 
overt criticism of the USSR or communism, concentrating instead on promoting Britain’s 
achievements.  Abstaining from negative propaganda had long been an important part of the 
British tradition in overseas publicity, and the magazine’s terms of reference made this all the 
more imperative.
42
 Far from being anti-Soviet, Anglia aimed to project an attitude of 
friendship and mutual respect between the two countries, for example, articles about science 
often mentioned the connections between British and Soviet scientists, and the magazine 
regularly reported on visits between the two countries, the activities of the GB-USSR 
Association and so on. More controversially, an article on ‘Lenin in London’ was even 
published in 1967 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, despite the 
initial reservations of some FO officials, who agreed that it should go ahead only if it was 
used as an opportunity to include photographs showing how the parts of London Lenin had 
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visited had changed for the better: ‘anything which brings home the point that Lenin’s ideas 
are totally unrelated to the world of today, without of course ever saying that!’43   
 
Rather than engaging in overtly negative propaganda, the Anglia team relied on telling a 
positive story about Britain. The Britain shown in Anglia was invariably economically 
advanced, socially progressive, culturally vibrant, and genuinely democratic. This ‘branding’ 
of Britain as modern and progressive was considered crucial given that Soviet propaganda 
constantly painted a picture of the country as backward-looking and in steady decline. At a 
time when the USSR seemed to many in the world to represent the future, Anglia needed to 
show that a modern Britain offered a viable alternative to the Soviet socialist model of 
modernity (and, to some extent, the American version of capitalist modernity too.) In 1961, 
as the first editions of the magazine were being planned, Mavis King maintained that while 
Anglia was barred from including overtly political material, it could not be entirely ‘non-
political’ and should offset the inevitable Soviet claims at the forthcoming Communist Party 
congress about the ‘decline of the west’. The IRD’s Mark Russell agreed they ‘must try to get 
across the impression of a progressive society which is moving forward all the time as against 
the picture of capitalist stagnation with which the Soviet public have been fed.’44 While the 
primary focus of Anglia was always expected to be upon ‘the vitality and diversity of 
contemporary Britain’, it was agreed that the magazine could include occasional articles 
about British cultural heritage to satisfy readers’ interest in Britain’s past. Articles about the 
Magna Carta, Bill of Rights and so on were deemed acceptable as long as their contemporary 
relevance was clearly established.
45
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This vision of an unequivocally modern and progressive Britain was necessarily based on a 
deliberately selective approach to the ‘truth’. As Lord Christopher Mayhew - one of the 
prime movers behind the creation of the IRD and an Anglia supporter - subsequently 
observed, the key to effective propaganda was the selection of facts: ‘The policy of IRD was 
not to lie or distort facts, but to select the facts that proved our case’.46 Written in a 
dispassionate rather than an opinionated style, Anglia’s articles incorporated a dazzling array 
of facts and figures; for example, detailed statistics were inserted into many of the articles, 
and the editor went to considerable lengths to ensure that these were up-to-date, accurate, and 
in line with those used by the BBC Russian service.
47
 To enhance credibility, the personal 
testimonies of concrete individuals were often incorporated, and, where possible, their direct 
speech was used since this was thought to be more convincing than indirect reporting. Visual 
images were also employed as evidence to substantiate the claims of the magazine, as well as 
to make it more interesting - while Anglia was never intended to be as lavishly illustrated as 
Amerika, it was still important that Soviet citizens could see aspects of British life for 
themselves. Appealing photographs accompanied many articles, particularly those devoted to 
fashion, furniture and so on. 
 
This attractive vision of Britain would have seemed unbalanced and unconvincing without 
some acknowledgement of the problems besetting the country. Right at the outset, Miller 
insisted that they should be ‘frank sometimes about our deficiencies.’48 However, the nature 
and extent of this frankness were never entirely clear. In 1961 Mavis King asked ‘are we 
allowed to include criticism, i.e. x houses have no indoor sanitation, 40 children in the class?’ 
Her opinion was that ‘some negative facts must be included, otherwise the Russians are going 
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to classify everything we say as propaganda.’ Mark Russell agreed that problems should not 
be hidden, but suggested that the magazine should always indicate what was being done to 
tackle issues such as slums. Bryan Cartledge also argued for a cautious approach since ‘the 
Soviet press pounces joyfully on admissions of defects in Western society and one gets no 
credit for “good sportsmanship” in showing both sides of the picture’; Pravda would delight 
in beginning an article ‘”According to the official British magazine Anglia 15% of British 
homes have no inside sanitation…”’ Cartledge recommended focusing on ‘past shortcomings 
which have been or are being remedied.’ Presenting as full a picture of Britain as possible, 
with the emphasis not on ‘hiding shortcomings’ but on showing how problems were being 
tackled was thus the approach which was said to inform editorial policy.
49
 Anglia was 
regarded by some as being in a somewhat different category from the BBC in this respect. In 
1971 one FO official noted that the BBC’s reputation for objectivity in the USSR was due in 
part to its willingness to show ‘some of the warts of British life’, and although it was not 
Anglia’s job to criticise life in the UK, there were some advantages to mentioning 
shortcomings. While concurring with the general principle, both Mavis King and the IRD’s 
Noel Marshall drew a distinction between the magazine and the BBC, arguing that the former 
could not afford to be quite so critical, since, as Marshall put it ‘The written word, legally 
available, is more vulnerable than the spoken word to be used against us.’ According to 
Marshall, the distorted picture of Britain that Soviet citizens received required ‘a bias in 
Anglia towards a more favourable image than complete objectivity would provide.’50 
 
A closer look at the actual contents of Anglia, as well as the constant dialogue between the 
COI and the Foreign Office concerning these, sheds light on how the principles of ‘subtle 
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propaganda’ were put into practice during the 1960s, the formative years of the magazine. 
From the beginning, there was discussion about what kind of material Anglia should contain. 
The COI suggested it focus on ‘the common experiences of people in relatively similar 
circumstances, so that the reader may readily identify himself with the subject of the 
article.’51 Anglia followed this recommendation to an extent, for many of its articles covered 
subjects of common interest and experience, particularly science and technology, industry 
and agriculture, the arts, sport and leisure. However, the view from the Embassy in Moscow 
was that British political objectives would be better served by dwelling on areas in which 
Britain differed substantially from the Soviet Union, such as government, the law, education, 
trade unions and so on.
52
 While this was precluded to an extent by the ‘non-political’ terms of 
the Anglia agreement, later issues did begin to incorporate more explicitly socio-political 
content designed to underline differences, rather than similarities, between the two societies. 
In addition, the magazine regularly featured extracts from contemporary British literature, 
crosswords, material on the regions of Britain, examples of humour and items in English. In 
order to avoid a ‘rag-bag’ appearance and to engage the serious reader with complex subjects, 
Anglia was frequently centred on one major theme, such as chemistry or travel, although 
most issues also contained some material unrelated to the theme.
 
 A representative example 
from the mid-sixties, Anglia no. 11, included articles connected to the main theme of British 
design, as well as material on parliamentary elections, cricket, books published in 1963, East 
Anglia, fashion, the nervous system, stamps and English sporting terminology, plus some 
caricatures, a short story and a crossword.
53
 
 
British achievements in industry, science and technology always featured prominently in 
Anglia, since these were thought most likely to reinforce an impression of modernity and 
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progress. Science in particular was accorded a high profile since it was taken very seriously 
in the USSR, and Soviet scientific successes, such as the Sputnik launch of 1957, represented 
a powerful challenge to the West. Moreover, the fundamentally international character of 
science made it a potentially fruitful way of transcending borders and of engaging the 
educated, scientifically-literate reader. In 1961, the Embassy’s Kenneth James urged that the 
magazine deal seriously with science and technology since ‘It will show that we are advanced 
technologically which, for the Russians, is the hallmark of a progressive, forward-looking 
and positive approach to life.’54 The very first issue of Anglia featured several articles about 
the world-famous Jodrell Bank radio-telescope which had been involved in tracking Soviet 
Sputniks, while the theme of the second issue was chemistry in Britain. The FO insisted that 
the accent should always be on contemporary science, rather than past achievements: Mavis 
King was particularly vexed by one article on British research in chemistry which she 
considered excessively focused on great British scientists of the C17-C19. She also objected 
to the line ‘young scientists work in the same laboratories and even among some of the very 
equipment used by these great men a hundred and fifty years ago’, claiming that this simply 
reinforced Soviet propaganda about the antiquated nature of Britain. The article was 
subsequently amended to give greater prominence to contemporary achievements.
55
 Material 
which contradicted the picture of Britain at the cutting edge of science and technology was 
rejected, such as a proposed article about Cambridge which allegedly played into Soviet 
stereotypes about British education as ‘tradition-dogged, untechnical and privilege-based.’ It 
was made clear that material on this theme should focus on ‘equality of opportunity and 
technical achievement.’56 
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As these comments about Cambridge indicate, Anglia was also expected to project an image 
of British society as modern, progressive and classless in order to counteract the Soviet 
picture of an old-fashioned country, riven with inequality and class conflict. Although items 
related to gender, generation, ethnicity and race did increasingly start to feature in the 
magazine, given the Soviet preoccupation with class, it was this issue which predominated 
and occupied the attention of those responsible for Anglia. Britain was presented as a land of 
contented workers and consumers reaping the benefits of a buoyant economy and thriving 
welfare state. Class divides and socio-economic problems were not completely ignored, but 
were presented as in the process of being rapidly transcended.  
 
British workers were invariably shown employed in productive, fulfilling and well-
remunerated labour. For example, a special issue of Anglia devoted to British youth featured 
a series of profiles of 14 ‘representative’ young people, all of whom had satisfying jobs in 
factories, farming, architecture, nursing, the entertainment industry, and so on. The 
accompanying photographs depicted uniformly attractive and happy-looking young men and 
women, a quite deliberate strategy which earned the approval of Wright Miller, who 
commented ‘I am glad to say there are one or two excellent types and good-looking girls 
among them.’57 One photograph of a young miner from Morpeth would not have looked out 
of place in a Soviet propaganda magazine. Mavis King had insisted that the articles about 
these young Britons incorporate plenty of direct speech, and their testimonies painted a 
glowing picture of working conditions and opportunities for social mobility in Britain.
58
 All 
the young people appeared to face a bright future, even a Welsh factory-worker, who was 
fundamentally optimistic, despite hoping for greater equality in Britain: ‘I do not fear 
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unemployment, and I think that in South Wales none of us fears it.’59 The controversial 
question of unemployment was always a sensitive matter for Anglia - its existence was not 
concealed, but it did require careful handling. In 1963, Wright Miller suggested that a feature 
about the Midlands could include regional unemployment figures since these were not too 
high at the time, and because the Soviet magazine, Ogonek, had recently mentioned 
unemployment in Liverpool. The cultural attaché at the Embassy in Moscow, Alan Brooke 
Turner, agreed, but only on condition that the figures were broken down to indicate those 
who were unfit, recent school-leavers etc., and that the figures for unfulfilled vacancies were 
supplied.
60
  
 
Care was also taken to ensure that workers’ wages and living standards appeared to be high. 
Wright Miller determined that the figure given for the average wage in an article ‘Great 
Britain in Figures’ should be that for males over 21 in the manufacturing industries, since the 
wages of juveniles and women would otherwise have pulled it down.
61
  Workers were 
portrayed as in a position to afford the dazzling selection of consumer goods, especially 
fashion, which were a staple feature of the magazine - for example an article on Marks and 
Spencer’s retail practices made a point of mentioning that the clothes were within the means 
of the store’s salespeople.62 Likewise, leisure opportunities were portrayed as affordable to 
all, regardless of class background. Travel was considered a desirable theme from a political 
perspective, since it underlined the existence of unrestricted movement in the West, but 
articles on the subject were expected to accentuate the diversity of classes spending holidays 
abroad, as well as the freedom to travel itself.
63
 Even such an innocuous subject as gardening 
warranted careful treatment, with one article on the theme raising concern because of ‘the 
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rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate’ implications. Brooke Turner suggested it be 
amended to show how gardening, like football, was a lingua franca which linked all classes, 
claiming that this ‘would help to offset the ‘class struggle’ implications of the article.’ Wright 
Miller duly added some appropriate phrases: ‘One might say that in the main we have all 
become gardeners now. As a subject of discussion in clubs, pubs and trains, gardening may 
be compared with football. It is a nationwide interest, shared by people of all professions and 
people of every grade and income…’ Miller was worried, however, that ‘protestations about 
the classes sharing things only draw attention to the existence of classes’, so he made sure to 
follow this statement with precise examples of how what he called ‘our “classless” gardeners’ 
actually cooperated.
64
  
 
Although it was obviously essential from a political perspective to depict Britain as socio-
economically progressive, it was no less important to portray the country as home to a 
diverse, innovative and widely-accessible modern culture. This served to accentuate the 
existence of freedom of expression and counter the barrage of Soviet propaganda denigrating 
the shallow materialism of the capitalist West, while also appealing to the interests of the 
target readership, the culturally-voracious Soviet intelligentsia. It was doubtless also useful to 
demonstrate that Britain boasted a culture that was distinct from that of the US in both its 
high and popular variants.  
 
British cultural heritage was a huge asset which was perennially popular with Soviet readers, 
so from time to time Anglia did include articles on the work of great British figures from the 
past. Charles Dickens was the subject of a piece by Raymond Williams in the third issue 
(Wright Miller insisted this made it clear that Britain had changed since Dickens’ time), one 
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issue took Shakespeare as its theme, while another included an article on English classical 
painters.
65
 However, the predominant emphasis was always upon the vitality of contemporary 
British culture. Readers were offered a regular diet of material on modern artists, writers and 
composers, including Henry Moore, Barbara Hepworth, Stanley Spencer, T. S. Eliot, Michael 
Tippett and Benjamin Britten.
66
 Whereas art and music tended not to pose obvious political 
dilemmas, literature was more problematic: concerns were expressed that some modern 
literature was too controversial for discussion in Anglia, such as the plays of the ‘Angry 
Young Man’, Arnold Wesker. Examples of contemporary British literature, such as short 
stories or poems, were included in most issues, although it proved quite difficult to find 
suitably accessible and politically acceptable work. In 1964 it was decided that short stories 
which examined less favourable aspects of British life could be considered for publication, 
however in 1967 Mavis King noted that much modern literature had to be rejected because it 
portrayed Britain in such a negative light.
67
  
 
More ‘popular’ forms of modern British culture also featured in Anglia in the form of articles 
on British jazz, contemporary cinema, and eventually even the ultra-modern ‘pop’ music, an 
area in which Britain was undisputedly setting the pace. George Melly’s 1966 article, 
designed to explain this new phenomenon to Soviet readers, was illustrated with photos of a 
glittering array of British stars from the Beatles to Cliff Richard.
68
 The quintessentially 
modern cultural media of TV and radio were examined in a special issue of Anglia devoted to 
broadcasting (the latter also provided an opportunity to highlight the widespread ownership 
of TV sets in Britain.)
69
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While the terms of the Anglo-Soviet agreement implied that explicitly political content was, 
in theory, strictly off limits, the IRD was nevertheless eager for Anglia to convey some 
information about the merits of British democracy. In October 1963, when the magazine’s 
position in the USSR appeared reasonably secure, Mark Russell argued that they had been 
non-controversial for long enough; while initially they had been concerned to avoid offending 
the Soviet authorities, now the time had come to address topics such as the police, the legal 
system, and elections. Although they should not seek to ‘provoke criticism’, he believed it 
would not matter too much if they were attacked in the Soviet press, since this could in itself 
serve as useful publicity.
70
 From then on, Anglia started to feature articles on subjects such as 
parliamentary elections, local government, and ‘A day in the life of the Prime Minister’. 
Debates were also introduced to illustrate the significance of divergent views, such as one for 
and against specialisation in post-16 education. While the importance of tradition in the 
British political system was acknowledged, considerable emphasis was placed on more 
modern elements, such as the use of the mass media in election campaigns, and the role of 
opinion polls in a democracy.
71
  
 
Although there was always some discussion about how best to portray the nation, in the early 
years there was remarkably little dissent from the view that Anglia should project a 
deliberately selective image of Britain and that the FO should play the major role in shaping 
the contents of the magazine. However, serious friction did emerge when Wright Miller was 
replaced with a new editor upon his retirement in 1967. Ned Thomas, most recently a British 
Council English lecturer in Moscow, had considerable journalistic experience under his belt. 
Mavis King warned that he would ‘need a fair amount of training and guidance.’72 When 
Wright Miller suggested he consider the position, Thomas asked to what extent the editor had 
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‘a free hand in the shaping of Anglia.’73 It is unclear what the response was to this enquiry, 
but evidently once in post he found the amount of ‘guidance’ he was required to receive from 
the FO intolerable and he ended up tendering his resignation after less than a year.  
 
In a letter to the IRD’s Nicholas Bayne, Thomas explained why he considered the FO’s 
‘detailed day-to-day control of the contents, down to pictures and turns of phrase’ to be 
unnecessary and even harmful: ‘Not only as a journalist but as a British citizen I draw a line 
between a system under which a Government Department employs people to “put Britain 
across” and a system under which that department itself insists on the deletion of words, 
sentences and paragraphs in what is not a policy document or a political journal but a 
magazine of British life.’ He argued that the editor should have real, rather than nominal, 
responsibility for Anglia, and that the magazine would benefit from the input of an editorial 
advisory board consisting of distinguished figures from a variety of walks of life to allow for 
a more balanced presentation of Britain. Thomas’ letter to the COI’s Director of Publications 
contained similar criticisms of FO scrutiny. He drew unfavourable comparisons between 
Anglia and the BBC Russian service, claiming that the latter enjoyed greater editorial 
independence. He recalled hearing Wright Miller answer questions in Moscow about how far 
Anglia was ‘propaganda.’ Miller had stated that of course the magazine would not include an 
article on slums in Britain, but that an article on housing would not conceal the existence of 
slums. Thomas said that he could not honestly give the same talk because he knew that ‘many 
small references of a negative nature’ were removed.74 
 
Much to the consternation of the FO, the Cardiff-based newspaper, the Western Mail, picked 
up on the story of Thomas’ resignation, and used it to imply that the Government was 
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engaged in media censorship, quoting Thomas to the effect that the FO was exercising 
excessive control primarily in order to ensure a favourable depiction of Britain. The Mail 
suggested that if the Government was trying to conceal things ‘the conduct of the Foreign 
Office would cast a regrettable shadow over the high and justified reputation of British news 
media for their objectivity and determination always to present a balanced view.’75 The 
deliberately distorted image of Britain in Anglia and the level of Foreign Office interference 
thus raised some uncomfortable questions. In the eyes of some, Britain had come to mirror its 
adversary, the Soviet Union, in its attempts to manipulate a magazine for political ends.
76
 
Reviewing the first issue of Anglia, the Glasgow Herald questioned whether the contents 
were ‘really representative of Britain? Where are the pop stars?’ and ‘the slums of Salford?’ 
while the literary magazine John O’London’s Weekly observed little difference between 
Anglia and Soviet official hand-outs:  
 
So Anglia may not be the best magazine we could produce but it does look as if it’s 
the best we shall be allowed to offer. But when are the power blocs going to stop 
hiding from the truth about the other side? Is truth really so dangerous? Or are both 
Russians and the Western powers afraid that their respective ways of life are so much 
less perfect than they would have their opponents believe?’77  
 
The FO response to such allegations was always to maintain that it was the nature of the 
Soviet Union and its policies which warranted the exceptional measures. Following the Ned 
Thomas episode, Bayne argued to the head of the IRD that the department’s oversight of the 
magazine was justified for several reasons: to ensure that the Soviets were not provoked, to 
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verify that Anglia was providing a ‘truthful and accurate account of British life as a positive 
antidote to the version in the Soviet press’ and was in line with government policy, and to 
check that the magazine was comprehensible to readers.  An unusual level of control was 
necessary because of Anglia’s unique status as the only freely-circulating British publication 
in the USSR.
78
 Bolstered by arguments such as these, the IRD continued to supervise of the 
work of Thomas’ rather more compliant successor. 
 
Evaluating the Soviet reception of Anglia 
More significant, perhaps, than the public response to Anglia in Britain, where its resonance 
was necessarily limited, was the reception of the magazine in the USSR itself. How was 
Britain’s ‘quiet propaganda’ received by its intended readership? If the impact of such 
ventures is notoriously hard to gauge in the best of circumstances, it was infinitely more 
difficult to assess the influence of Western initiatives in the USSR, given all the barriers to 
unfettered communication. Determined to gain some sense of the effectiveness of their 
efforts, governments and broadcasters had to rely on all manner of available sources, 
including Soviet visitors to the West, and even defectors.
79
 The FO, its attempts to evaluate 
the reception of Anglia, resorted to what it could glean from limited evidence ranging from 
data about distribution, to informal conversations and rare but precious readers’ letters.  
 
The magazine’s distribution was the object of constant British scrutiny because of fears that 
the Soviet authorities might be obstructing its circulation. Encouragingly, no copies of Anglia 
were ever returned as ‘unsold’ by Soiuzpechat’, apart from the few that had been damaged.  
This was in stark contrast to the position with Amerika, several thousand copies of which 
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were returned every month, partly in retaliation for poor sales of its Soviet counterpart in the 
US. It was evident that demand for Anglia was high, since there were constant reports that 
Soviet citizens could not obtain a copy: even the wife of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Andrei Gromyko, reported that the Ministry had received many letters complaining that the 
print run was so small.
80
 There was some evidence that Anglia had a ‘black market’ value and 
it was known that copies did pass from hand to hand, as well as being made available in 
public libraries.
81
 In this way, the magazine did reach many more readers than its print run of 
50,000 would suggest. From 1966, Britain began to press the Soviet authorities to double the 
circulation quota from 50,000 to 100,000 per quarter. The Soviet side was not enthusiastic, 
partly because of the question of reciprocity with Soviet Weekly. However after much 
negotiation, an agreement was reached in 1968, and it seems that the extra 50,000 copies 
were not difficult to distribute.  
 
Evidence suggested that the magazine was reaching and being read by actual and potential 
opinion leaders, i.e. the young (especially students), intellectuals, professionals and the 
political elite. It was known that Alexei Kosygin, Dmitrii Ustinov and other members of the 
government were readers. Regular subscribers included the administrator of the Komsomol 
Theatre, a leading actor at the Young People’s Theatre in Leningrad, and a key Izvestiia 
commentator. It was also read by residents of the non-Russian republics, including academics 
in Georgia and Armenia.
82
 The FO seemed confident that this high-level readership, as well 
as the unobstructed distribution of the magazine, signified that Anglia was accepted, if not 
wholeheartedly embraced, by the Soviet authorities. During his visits to the USSR, Wright 
Miller received reassuring messages of support from official Soviet bodies, such as the 
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USSR-GB Association, Soiuzpechat’ and the State Committee for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries.
83
 The Soviet press rarely attacked the magazine, and when it did so, the 
criticism tended to be confined to less important publications such as the Komsomol’s 
magazine Rovesnik, which on one occasion berated the special issue of Anglia devoted to 
youth for its failure to address the on-going class conflicts in Britain.
84
  
 
While the FO was clearly concerned to monitor official Soviet responses to Anglia, it was no 
less interested in gaining more informal feedback on the magazine. The British Embassy 
staff, other Moscow-based diplomats and the foreign correspondents of Western newspapers 
and news agencies all provided useful intelligence. Perhaps even more valuable were the trips 
to the Soviet Union made by the editor and assistant editor of the magazine, who made a 
point of talking to members of the Soviet public, from students to taxi drivers, mainly in 
Moscow and Leningrad, but also in other cities, including Kiev, Tashkent, Minsk and Tallinn. 
Finally, letters sent to the magazine by Soviet readers served as a crucial source of informal 
feedback, despite their necessarily limited numbers and typically innocuous content. 
Censorship of mail continued to be routine in the post-Stalin USSR and corresponding with 
foreigners was still regarded as a risky activity: Mavis King observed that the 30 letters they 
had received in 1962 might not seem many, but were ‘more than I dared to hope for’ (by way 
of comparison, it is worth noting that the much more widely available BBC Russian Service 
only received 41 letters in 1956, and somewhat over a hundred in 1963).
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 Between 1962 and 
1969, 240 letters reached the offices of Anglia from as far afield as Magadan, Perm, 
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Vladivostok and Yalta.
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 Most emanated from the desired target groups, i.e. the young and 
professionals, and while the majority wrote in Russian, some correspondents enjoyed 
practising their English. They generally supplied their names and addresses, and the editors 
of Anglia often went to some trouble to correspond with them.  
  
Sources such as these were far from representative, but in the absence of superior 
alternatives, the FO drew on them in an attempt to establish the extent to which Anglia was 
achieving its aims. Of course, this kind of evidence was unlikely to yield clear-cut answers to 
the question of whether the magazine was altering perceptions of Britain (or the Soviet 
system, for that matter), but it could at least shed some light on whether Anglia was regarded 
as ‘capitalist propaganda’ or as a reasonably objective source of information, and, more 
generally, what readers liked and disliked about the magazine. Inevitably, officials who 
interpreted this evidence could not entirely avoid their own prejudices, and were no doubt 
inclined to privilege the more positive feedback. However their analyses, when read in 
conjunction along with the letters themselves, succeed in conveying an impression of the 
diversity of Soviet response to Anglia.  
 
Some of the responses - allegedly a minority - were unfavourable: the assistant editor Jennifer 
Price encountered a few citizens who expressed complete indifference to the magazine – she 
described these as ‘comfortably off’, ‘depressingly, complacently insular.’ A medical student 
whom she met in Leningrad dismissed both Anglia and Amerika as ‘propaganda’ and claimed 
to prefer Soviet-produced English-language magazines, although when pressed, could not 
name any.
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 The Times correspondent reported a conversation in the train with two men of 
different generations. When the younger man mentioned that British TV was highly 
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developed, citing Anglia and Amerika as his source of information, the older man responded 
‘Well if you read those things, there is no point discussing the matter further.’88 This type of 
language echoed the official xenophobia of the late Stalin years, and was more extreme than 
the rather more flexible stance of the current Soviet authorities. 
 
However, generally reactions seemed positive. According to various British reports, some 
people liked Anglia precisely because it did not come across as particularly propagandistic, 
especially when compared with Amerika. Gromyko’s wife was said to approve of the fact that 
there was ‘no attempt to belittle Soviet things’ while Kosygin allegedly rated it as better than 
anything produced by Americans.
89
 Wright Miller recorded various flattering comparisons 
from members of the intelligentsia: Kudriavtsev of Izvestiia said ‘You don’t hammer in every 
nail, like Amerika’, while an actor commented that ‘You are always so clever and tactful, not 
loud like Amerika.’ Some even dared to draw comparisons with Soviet propaganda: Professor 
Anikst, the leading Soviet authority on Shakespeare, remarked at a private party: ‘”Anglia 
doesn’t make the same mistakes as Amerika”…”or us!” (he added behind his hand).’ 
Professor Akhmanova, an expert on the English language, said: ‘”You are the equal of the 
BBC which is the world’s best broadcasting service. You are so perfectly tactful; it is the only 
way to do things. As for Amerika -” (she turned to her neighbour and said “if you promise not 
to denounce me to the Party Committee!”) “as for Amerika, I sometimes think its propaganda 
is even worse than our own.”’ While in certain cases, as Mavis King suggested, these 
judgements about Anglia and Amerika may simply have been an example of people 
deliberately playing off the British and US against each other – such wedge-driving was a 
common Soviet Cold War tactic - it does seem that the more subtle approach of Anglia was 
favoured by some, although by no means all, readers: both Price and Miller heard the 
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opposite point of view, that Amerika, with its glossy photos and images of material 
abundance, was preferred.
 90
 
 
The strict rationing of information within the USSR created a tremendous ‘thirst for 
knowledge’ and many readers appeared to value Anglia as a source of useful and credible 
information.
 91
  Wright Miller observed an avid interest in all things foreign in the mid-
sixties, a demand to which Anglia catered very well. Three students in Moscow, whom Price 
described as ‘desperately conscious of lack of outside contacts’, bracketed it with the BBC as 
‘like a window on the world’ and asked that the magazine provide more information about 
everyday matters such as what people ate.
92
  While readers naturally avoided discussion of 
issues which might be construed as ‘political’, many appeared to find articles related to their 
professional and leisure interests particularly useful, and requested further information about 
these. For example, following the publication in the ‘youth’ issue of a profile of Diana 
Barnes, a postgraduate medical researcher, a professor at a Moscow children’s hospital wrote 
to find out whether Barnes could supply some specific information about breast cancer 
treatment, while a professor of Biological Sciences from Ul’ianovsk, who had read articles in 
the agriculture-themed issue, asked for further material on wheat selection in Britain. Many 
suggested to the editors that the magazine cover subjects related to their own interests, from 
fireworks to philosophy and sociology. There was much demand for material focused on 
British art, literature and cinema, while several expressed an enthusiasm for items  about 
British jazz and pop music.
93
 Not surprisingly, Anglia was particularly appreciated by 
teachers and students of English; in 1966 Wright Miller met a large number of English 
teachers who were ‘almost embarrassingly unanimous’ in their praise for the magazine; they, 
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and many others, asked for more of it to be printed in English.
94
 Often the editors responded 
very directly to readers’ requests by commissioning articles on the suggested themes or 
putting correspondents in touch with British specialists, a dialogue which no doubt helped to 
enhance the appeal of Anglia. While it was the serious information content which attracted 
the most comment, lighter material, such as crosswords and cartoons, was also singled out for 
praise, and there were many requests for more British humour - the FO agreed to this on 
condition that they ‘avoid whimsy like the plague.’95  
 
Despite the necessarily limited evidence base, the FO seemed quite satisfied with the Soviet 
response to Anglia, both on the official and unofficial level. Although 50,000 or even a 
100,000 copies every quarter might have seemed insignificant relative to the size of the 
Soviet population, as Wright Miller commented, the limited circulation belied the fact that 
the magazine had a ripple effect: it may have been slower than a weekly publication, but it 
spread just as far in the end.
96
 Although it was difficult to establish whether Anglia was 
actually changing attitudes, there was certainly a perception that it may have been. 
Christopher Mayhew declared to Parliament in 1963 that the image of Britain in the Soviet 
Union had improved recently in part due to the influence of the ‘excellent magazine’ Anglia, 
and proposed setting up similar periodicals for other Soviet bloc states.
97
 Financial 
constraints made this difficult, but a Polish magazine, Brytania, was eventually launched in 
1968. However, despite the perceived success of these initiatives, by the end of 1960s, the 
future of both Anglia and Brytania was increasingly being called into question. 
 
Defending Anglia 
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In part because of the difficulty of measuring the influence of the magazine, Anglia was often 
in the firing line when spending cuts were required. Such forms of ‘soft power’ are always 
easy targets, usually regarded as secondary to more tangible ‘hard’ military and economic 
needs. As the Soviet response to the Prague Spring in 1968 seemed to demonstrate that the 
Russian leopard would never change its spots, some concluded that British investment in 
cultural diplomacy was a waste of taxpayers’ money. With the Duncan report calling for cuts 
in the budget of overseas information work, Anglia’s future seemed to hang in the balance. 
 
At the end of the 1960s, the Duncan Committee on Overseas Representation recommended 
significant changes to British overseas information work in the light of new geopolitical and 
economic realities. Its report acknowledged the importance of what it called British 
‘propaganda’: ‘the propaganda arena is just as competitive as the political and commercial 
arenas in which this nation has to fight for survival’; to be effective, however, propaganda 
had to be commensurate with the country’s real status, and given that Britain was no longer 
‘a world power of the first order’, it was appropriate that it be projected primarily as ‘a 
trading nation with a great culture and democratic traditions’. It was argued that the main 
focus of information work should henceforth be commercial and cultural, rather than political 
and military. Most significantly as far as Anglia was concerned, the report suggested that 
money and effort could be saved by substantially reducing the projection of Britain via FO 
‘political and non-commercial hand-outs’ which were often regarded simply as pro-
government propaganda, and by relying rather on the British press, the British Council and 
the BBC. Official publicity and hand-outs should in future be directly linked to the needs of 
export promotion.
98
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The Duncan report thus called into question the very existence of Anglia. A subsequent 
Foreign Office review of FO-sponsored COI publications noted that Anglia and Brytania 
were the only remaining general projection magazines for overseas consumption since Al 
Aalam and Commonwealth Today had been axed. The review concluded that it was unlikely 
that the government would ever again publish such non-specialist magazines as part of its 
overseas information work. Anglia itself was costly (then about £60,000 net p.a.), its political 
content was not immediately evident, and the impact of the magazine hard to establish. While 
subscribers and the recipients of complimentary copies were probably the all-important 
‘multipliers’, those who bought it from kiosks might well be the ‘elderly, the nostalgic and 
the Anglophil.’ If the periodical were to continue, the proportion of industrial, scientific and 
technological content would have to be reviewed for ‘It cannot be right – behind the Iron 
Curtain, but nowhere else in the world - for so much emphasis in British propaganda to be 
placed on children’s books, rural scenery and yeoman warders of the Tower’.99  
 
Anglia now faced considerable pressure to adapt and survive by becoming more politically 
hard-hitting and/or more commercially-minded. However, this pressure encountered strong 
resistance from various quarters in the FO. Mavis King’s firm view was that the nature of the 
Anglia agreement precluded any further sharpening of the political contents. She maintained 
that the magazine did already fulfil a clear political function, since its ‘honest and accurate’ 
depiction of Britain both counteracted Soviet anti-British propaganda, and provided an 
obvious contrast with life in the Soviet Union.
 100
 Sir Duncan Wilson, the ambassador to the 
USSR, agreed that a more obvious political slant was likely to be counter-productive, 
emphasising that Anglia was accepted precisely because of its seeming objectivity: ‘To allow 
the magazine to start pointing the moral would be to encourage the readers to cease doing so.’ 
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Wilson also claimed that Anglia did in fact serve the needs of trade and commerce by 
projecting an image of Britain deemed desirable in the Duncan report, i.e. that of ‘a trading 
partner with a great culture and democratic tradition’. The magazine already contained 
commercially-oriented articles, and there was no need to increase the number of these, since 
Anglia was ‘a case “sui generis” which does not need extra justification in terms of 
commercial publicity.’101 King also opposed to any increase in the technological, scientific 
and industrial content, in part because Soviet citizens already had access to such material 
from other sources: ‘we consider it important to inject ideas’, she emphasised.102 In general, it 
was felt that many of the Duncan report recommendations were simply not applicable to 
work in a closed society where the BBC, British press and British Council could not 
function.
103
 David Beattie from the East European and Soviet Department stressed Anglia’s 
unique role as the only uncensored non-communist British publication generally available to 
the Soviet public. He pointed out that the Duncan report had endorsed the BBC’s broadcasts 
to Eastern Europe, and that Anglia made a similarly important contribution to keeping open 
lines of communication.
104
 
 
These arguments proved to be persuasive, and Anglia was permitted to survive without 
substantial modification: the one condition imposed by the Treasury was that its commercial 
content should increase from 24% to 35%. Nevertheless, despite this reprieve, Anglia 
remained vulnerable, and throughout the 1970s, the political and economic value of the 
magazine continued to be questioned, particularly in the context of accelerating détente. 
Ultimately, however, it was recognised that Anglia was a necessary undertaking, which could 
be justified by the exceptional circumstances of the Cold War. As the IRD’s Noel Marshall 
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put it in 1971, ‘Anglia is a unique British Government activity which should be compared in 
value for money, not with some information activity which happens to cost a similar sum, but 
with the cost of the cold war to HM Government.’105  
 
******* 
 
The Cold War was above all a war of ideologies and cultures, and national projection 
magazines were one, not insignificant, means by which this war was waged. Periodicals were 
perceived to have a remarkably high degree of international influence at this time: the 
Reader’s Digest was once bracketed with the Catholic Church and the Communist Party as 
one of the ‘three great international institutions’. Rather more soberly, a COI report of 1962 
claimed that ‘publicity by means of periodicals is perhaps the second most important 
information activity of the Iron Curtain countries – in some parts of the world, indeed, the 
most important…. our principal European information competitors, Western Germany, Italy 
and France, increasingly use the medium.’106   
 
National projection magazines took off against the backdrop of this periodical equivalent of 
an arms race. Although periodicals designed to ‘brand’ a nation had existed before – British 
Ally being a notable example – it was the Cold War which encouraged serious proliferation of 
the phenomenon. Such magazines provided a way for individual countries to circumvent the 
prevailing rhetoric of two monolithic blocs - ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ - and to present their 
own faces to the world.  Britain felt compelled to play its distinctive part in this emerging 
magazine diplomacy, and Anglia was the result.  
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As Cold War historians begin to gravitate away from ‘phenomena of the great’ to the 
‘phenomena of the small’, attention has turned to the ostensibly minor actors, processes and 
initiatives that were important despite or even because of their size.
107
 Anglia satisfied this 
criterion of a ‘small’ undertaking on many counts: produced by one of the smaller ‘great 
powers’, it cost relatively little and was designed to have a modest reach. In terms of physical 
appearance it was, quite literally, small. Yet, in part because of its small and non-threatening 
character, it represented a valuable instrument of soft power. It explained Britain to Soviet 
readers who were hungry for information about the West and who often had only the haziest 
and most distorted understanding of the country. While it offered a deliberately selective, 
rosy vision of modern Britain, it was far from being crude and manipulative propaganda. In 
its avoidance of the hard-sell, in its attempt to engage in a serious dialogue with its readers 
and respond to their interests, and in its commitment to fostering understanding over the long 
term, it exemplified a more subtle mode of influencing Soviet opinion (a mode which 
eventually came to characterise aspects of US ‘public diplomacy’ too.108)  
 
Surviving a succession of political crises and financial challenges, Anglia represented a small 
but continuous channel of communication between Britain and the Soviet public for thirty 
years. By 1992, when the last issues of the magazine appeared, the Cold War was over. We 
should, of course, resist the temptation to overstate the importance of what was, after all, just 
one ‘drop of water’ among many. However, would it not be legitimate to conclude that, in its 
own small way, Anglia may have made some contribution to the process which brought the 
conflict to an end? 
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